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ABSTRACT. This article presents an alternative interpretation of Scottish politics between 
1945 and 1970, a period that witnessed the decline of a once-powerful Unionist tradition, the 
revival of Liberalism, and rise of the Scottish National Party. While existing accounts have 
focused principally upon social and economic factors, this study foregrounds the role of 
ideology and rhetoric. During the 1940s and early 1950s, Scottish Unionists were, like their 
Conservative colleagues elsewhere in Britain, able to construct a popular, but essentially 
negative, anti-socialist coalition that prioritised the defence of individual liberty. This 
electoral alliance, defined by opposition to Labour’s programme of nationalisation and 
expressed via an individualist idiom, was able to attract broad support; it was, however, 
always provisional, and proved increasingly difficult to sustain after the Conservative party 
returned to office in 1951. It was, this article suggests, the fragmenting of this anti-socialist 
coalition in the late 1950s and early 1960s that created the opportunity for both the Liberals 
and the SNP to present alternative renderings of this individualist appeal, and to emerge as 
credible political alternatives. Crucially, by the 1960s individual liberty was beginning to be 
understood in constitutional rather than economic terms. 
 
The quarter century following the Second World War saw the transformation of Scottish 
politics. In the decade after 1945 election results in Scotland largely mirrored wider British 
trends, with Labour initially dominant, before the Unionists, as the Conservatives were 
Rethinking the realignment of Scottish politics, 1945–1970 
2 
 
labelled in Scotland until 1965, recovered in the early 1950s.1 From the 1959 general election 
onwards, however, Labour enjoyed an electoral supremacy that would survive for more than 
five decades; in contrast, the Unionists, and their Conservative successors, entered an era of 
sustained decline. Scottish Conservatism’s travails were accentuated by the resuscitation of 
Liberalism and the arrival of the Scottish National Party (SNP) as a credible political force. 
By the 1970s, a distinctive four-party Scottish electoral contest was established.2 
 Assessments of this period of political realignment have emphasised the importance 
of several factors. Secularisation eroded the popular Protestantism that underpinned working-
class Unionism, exposing the party to accusations that it represented only a remote and 
Anglicised landed elite, and encouraging younger voters to view the SNP with greater 
sympathy. Further, the growing reliance of Scots on the public sector for employment and 
housing, coupled with the relative weakness of the Scottish economy from the late 1950s, 
entrenched support for the Labour party in urban and industrial areas, while simultaneously 
lending weight to nationalist criticisms of the performance of successive Westminster 
regimes. The improved fortunes of the SNP have, perhaps more speculatively, been attributed 
too to a loss of faith in British identity triggered by economic stagnation and imperial retreat.3 
Equally, political scientists have suggested that the fall in Unionist support after 1959 
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Home”? Scottish Separatism at Empire’s End’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 25 (2015), 159–85. 
Rethinking the realignment of Scottish politics, 1945–1970 
3 
 
represented the assertion of ‘natural’ political allegiances, as Scotland’s social and economic 
structure began to be reflected at the polls.4 It is, in such a reading, the anomaly of earlier 
Unionist success that needs explanation, with the distinctive Scottish aspects of the party’s 
appeal being highlighted.5 
 Such developments were undoubtedly significant. The intention in this study is, 
nonetheless, to offer a different perspective, one that both complements and complicates 
existing accounts by foregrounding the role of ideology in post-war Scottish politics, as 
disclosed chiefly through political rhetoric. Since the 1920s, Unionists had exploited 
concerns over the alleged threat posed by socialism to attract the support of erstwhile 
Liberals, often building upon the purportedly non-partisan anti-Labour pacts established at a 
municipal level.6 During the 1940s this anti-socialist appeal was amplified by wartime 
experiences and the election of the first majority Labour government, imbuing Unionism with 
an individualist idiom centred upon the defence of individual liberty, and opposed to the 
expansion of the authority of central government. The principal divide within Scottish 
political debate after 1945 was provided not by class, or by attitudes towards the constitution, 
but by this contest between individualism and socialism. Efforts to understand post-war 
Scottish politics require an examination of why the electoral alliance assembled beneath the 
Unionist banner, and held together by an appeal to individual freedom, began to disintegrate. 
We should, then, reconsider the language used by Unionist politicians and their allies, as well 
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as the worldview they promoted. In doing so, we may relate an assessment of Scottish 
politics to wider British debates, and especially those that concern the fluctuating fortunes of 
what W. H. Greenleaf described as the ‘libertarian strand’ within British political thought.7 
Libertarian in this context should, of course, not be interpreted in a literal or absolute manner, 
but rather as denoting an inclination to view the growing power of the central state with 
foreboding, alongside a scepticism regarding the viability of economic planning.8 
 The primary concern here is, then, with the attempts of politicians to secure public 
support, to convince voters to view matters in a certain way; the focus is, by necessity, on 
what politicians said. As scholars of political rhetoric have recognised, ideologies are more 
than sets of substantive policy positions: they are, as Alan Finlayson and James Martin have 
stressed, also a matter of ‘a “mood”, an emotional register and a style of presentation’.9 The 
analysis that follows is designed to trace the temper of post-war Scottish politics, particularly 
among that half of the electorate unconvinced by the claims of the Labour party. First, the 
nature of the Unionist appeal after 1945 is outlined; second, the rise of discontent among 
Unionist supporters in the late 1950s is explored alongside the upturn in the fortunes of the 
Liberal party; third, the Unionist response to the 1959 general election is examined; lastly, the 




7 W. H. Greenleaf, The British Political Tradition, Volume II: The Ideological Heritage (1983), 263–346. 
8 See: J. Ramsden, The Age of Churchill and Eden, 1940–1957 (1995), 166–76; E. H. H. Green, The Ideologies 
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and Rhetoric’, British Politics 3(4) (2008), 451. See also: R. Barker, ‘Hooks and Hands, Interests and Enemies: 
Political Thinking as Political Action’, Political Studies 48(2) (2000), 223–38; A. Finlayson, ‘Political Science, 
Political Ideas and Rhetoric’, Economy and Society 33(4), 528–49; R. Toye, Rhetoric (Oxford, 2013). 
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The Unionists, in common with their Conservative colleagues in England, contested the 1945 
general election on a platform of defending individual freedom and lifting the economic 
controls imposed during wartime. The campaign culminated with Winston Churchill’s 
infamous radio broadcast, where, echoing Friedrich Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, published the 
previous year, he warned that a Labour victory, and the ensuing introduction of socialism, 
would presage a slide into tyranny.10 The result was, nevertheless, a Labour landslide, with 
the Conservatives enduring their worst defeat since 1906. Yet the party soon regrouped: at 
the 1950 general election Labour’s parliamentary majority was reduced to five; the following 
year the Conservatives returned to power, and remained in office for over a decade. 
Traditionally, the Conservative revival was attributed to the party’s acceptance of the 
new political landscape created by the war and confirmed by Labour’s victory in 1945, one in 
which the primary role of government was to ensure full employment, manage a mixed 
economy, and oversee the running of the nascent welfare state.11 It was, in this model, not 
until the 1970s that this governing consensus collapsed, amid economic crisis and the 
Conservative party’s turn to the right under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher.12 Since the 
1990s, however, this interpretation has been questioned, and the extent to which Conservative 
opinion remained unreconciled to the post-war settlement emphasised. Ina Zweiniger-
Bargielowska highlighted the crucial role that opposition to rationing, particularly among 
female voters, played in the Conservative victory in 1951; likewise, Harriet Jones argued that 
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post-war Conservatism was hostile towards redistributive taxation and universal welfare 
provision.13 For Ewen Green, notions of a post-war consensus were weakened by the 
continued influence within Conservative ranks of ‘liberal-market’ opposition to state 
intervention.14 As Green noted drily, the party’s slogan in this era was ‘“Set the People Free”, 
not the welfare state and the mixed economy are safe in our hands’.15 
Still, these debates have had relatively little impact on studies of Scottish politics, 
where the conviction that Unionist success hinged upon a combination of an appeal to 
Scottish identity and an embrace of corporatism remains dominant.16 Yet this assessment is at 
odds with the rhetoric often deployed by the party, infused as it could be with Hayekian 
warnings that the increasing powers accrued by the central state, while perhaps necessary 
during wartime, had become a threat to personal freedom, and claims that Labour’s 
programme of nationalisation would, if allowed to continue, lead inexorably to 
totalitarianism. As the party’s western divisional council declared in 1948, the Labour 
government had overseen the erection of ‘a crazy economy’ characterised by ‘crushing 
taxation, restrictive controls, subsidies and a depreciated currency’: the public must choose 
‘between the Unionist policy of a free economy and the democratic way of life on the one 
hand, and Socialist State monopoly and eventual servitude on the other’.17 
Individual Unionist politicians could speak in similarly apocalyptic terms. At a 
constituency association meeting in late 1946, William McNair Snadden, MP for Kinross and 
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West Perthshire, advised that the ‘Socialist [i.e. Labour] policy of concentrating power into 
the hands of a few political bosses would result in the … final destruction of the freedom of 
the individual’: he urged all ‘anti-socialists’ to unite, since, if they remained divided, ‘they 
made certain of bringing about the very thing they had fought for six years to destroy – the 
Totalitarian State’. A year later, following the introduction of direction of labour, Snadden 
warned that the ‘fundamental right of the citizen to choose his own work was being taken 
away [and] if they did not bring down the Government then the Government would bring 
down the nation’.18 Such doom-laden predictions were, no matter how hyperbolic, a common 
refrain, as Unionists depicted every political issue as evidence of the need to remove the 
Labour government from office. At a mass rally at Callender House in Falkirk, James Reid, 
the Unionist MP for Glasgow Hillhead who had served as Lord Advocate in the wartime 
coalition, stated that the next general election ‘would be vital for the future of this country’, 
since if Labour was re-elected, ‘they would drift to the left and freedom and prosperity would 
be so far gone that perhaps we should never recover’.19 A few months later Reid’s Unionist 
counterpart in Glasgow Central, James Hutchison, declared that nationalisation had created ‘a 
race of sycophants – people who were always wondering if the man above was satisfied’. The 
public, he lamented, ‘simply did not realise just how dangerous a situation was being created 
for them’.20 Alan Gomme Duncan, the Unionist member for Perth, was even blunter: if 
Labour secured another term, he warned, it would mark the ‘last general election in this 
country’.21 
Of course, none of these hysterical predictions were borne out by events; nor is it 
clear that the politicians who made them believed what they said. These limitations are, 
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Minutes, 30 Nov. 1946 and 29 Nov. 1947. Capitalisation in original. Direction of labour was intended to ensure 
that those out of work were guided towards vacancies in productive, export-led industries. 
19 Grangemouth Advertiser, 24 Jul. 1948. 
20 Falkirk Herald, 27 Nov. 1948. 
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nevertheless, comparatively unimportant: such statements were, to use Maurice Cowling’s 
formulation, ‘a form of exemplary utterance’, an ‘attempt to provide new landmarks for the 
electorate’.22 What matters is that it was through an explicit rejection of consensus, and the 
promotion of a binary political contest structured around opposition to socialism, that 
Unionist politicians believed they could win public backing. Clearly, this approach was not 
total, or necessarily coherent: the party did not reject government action in every field; 
notably, Unionists, like their Conservative counterparts in England and Wales, considered 
local government to be an important source of civic identity and an essential counterweight to 
the expansion of the central state.23 The dangers of socialism stemmed from centralisation, as 
embodied by the ‘vast State monopolies’ created to administer the nationalised industries.24 
This conception of post-war politics informed the Unionist appeal to Scottish national 
identity, usually treated as a cynical, if nonetheless successful, effort to provoke opposition to 
nationalisation from the safety of opposition.25 There was, no doubt, a degree of electoral 
calculation present: it was not mere chance that the Unionist promotion of Scottish autonomy 
coincided with the launch of the Scottish Covenant, a mass petition in support of home rule 
organised by John MacCormick, the former national secretary of the SNP.26 And, as Matthew 
Cragoe has shown, sympathy towards Scottish and Welsh sensibilities was integral to 
Conservatism’s broader ‘discourse of decentralisation’.27 But it would be wrong to dismiss 
this simply as tactics: as with the defence of local government, the promotion of Scottish 
distinctiveness was effective because it could be accommodated within, and even strengthen, 
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a pre-existing critique of centralised bureaucracy. It was not just that the growing dominance 
of Whitehall and Westminster threatened Scottish autonomy: socialism was a form of 
‘despotism’, a political philosophy hostile to ‘individuality either in men or in nations’.28 
Equally, Churchill’s deployment of quasi-nationalist language when appearing in Scotland 
during the 1950 and 1951 general election campaigns was tempered by his assertion that it 
was the prospect of the ‘serfdom of socialism’ that threatened the union between Scotland 
and England.29 Even in the case of John MacCormick’s candidacy at the 1948 Paisley by-
election, when MacCormick felt he had united Labour’s opponents on a home rule platform, 
local Unionists backed him only on the basis that he was the ‘anti-socialist candidate’.30 
For all that Unionism was defined by hostility to socialism, it was not narrowly 
partisan in outlook. If anything, the urgency of the threat alleged to be posed by Labour 
required the construction of a broad-based anti-socialist coalition. This strategy was evident 
in the 1947 pact concluded with the National Liberals, which saw the parties merge their 
constituency apparatus in some sixty seats.31 As the parties declared in a joint statement, there 
was ‘one fundamental political issue’, namely ‘whether the principles of liberty of the 
individual’ and ‘freedom of enterprise’ would survive, ‘or whether the Socialist doctrine of 
regimentation, state-ownership and centralised control is to prevail’.32 National Liberalism, 
which originated with those Liberals who remained loyal to the National Government after 
the abandonment of free trade in 1932, has been largely forgotten, with the 1947 agreement 
viewed as marking the effective end of the party’s independent existence.33 This may have 
been true in England, where the relative strength of Conservatism was far greater. In 
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Scotland, though, National Liberalism enjoyed a long afterlife, exerting influence throughout 
the 1950s. Of the sixty joint constituency associations established by 1950, fifteen were in 
Scotland; in the decade that followed, the National Liberals routinely secured the support of 
just under one in ten Scottish voters, while the number of candidates adopting some form of 
the label increased.34 National Liberalism’s appeal was especially potent in the north east, 
south west and Highlands, areas of historic Conservative weakness: here Unionism bent 
towards an entrenched Liberalism. Conspicuous too was the prominence of National Liberals 
sitting for Scottish seats both in the leadership of their party at Westminster, and, after 1951, 
in ministerial roles at the Scottish Office. Between 1947 and 1964, the position of National 
Liberal chairman was held exclusively by Scottish MPs, while John Maclay, National Liberal 
MP for West Renfrewshire, served as Secretary of State for Scotland between 1957 and 1962; 
Niall MacPherson and James Henderson-Stewart, who sat as National Liberals for Galloway 
and East Fife respectively, were both junior Scottish Office ministers in this period.35 The 
National Liberals were not, as has been suggested, simply ‘absorbed’ by the Unionists.36 
 More even than support at the polls or personnel in cabinet, National Liberalism 
offered Unionism’s instinctive anti-socialism, inherited from the 1920s and defined by 
allegations that socialism was a close relative of Bolshevism, and posed a similar threat to 
organised religion and family life, a more coherent intellectual framework.37 If, in England, 
former Liberals were enlisted as ‘subaltern anti-socialists’, across rural and provincial 
Scotland the Unionists, through their association with National Liberalism, operated as ersatz 
Liberals.38 Post-war Unionism is, then, understood best as composite in nature, as a coalition 
																																								 																				
34 Hutchison, Scottish Politics, 76–9.  
35 From 1947 until 1956 the role of National Liberal chairman was performed by John Maclay; Maclay was 
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(ed.), Unionist Scotland, 82–4. 
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of Conservatives, Liberals and even nationalists united by a shared opposition to socialism. 
Such a view was given voice by Henderson-Stewart when he addressed a meeting of Unionist 
and National Liberal activists in South Angus in November 1949. Warning that if Labour was 
returned to power for a second term then liberal values would disappear ‘for a generation’, 
Henderson-Stewart urged Liberal and nationalists to support what he termed the ‘coalition led 
by Mr Churchill’, since if there was ‘a straight fight in every constituency’, Labour ‘would be 
thrashed’.39 A year later Maclay called similarly for a ‘united front’ to defeat socialism, and 
asked Liberals to overlook their historic opposition to Toryism and prioritise instead their 
shared commitment to individual freedom.40  
 The arrangement with the National Liberals was intended to act as a prelude to a 
wider pact with the Liberal party. Although a formal alliance would prove elusive, winning 
over those who traditionally voted Liberal was central to Conservative electoral strategy.41 As 
the party’s 1950 campaign guide argued, there was ‘little fundamental difference between the 
Conservatives and Liberals such as exists between these parties and the bureaucratic and, at 
times, totalitarian control of the present Socialist Party’.42 Indeed, the dramatic fall in the 
number of Liberal candidates at the 1951 general election was a critical factor in the 
Conservative victory. But Liberal retrenchment was partly a recognition of electoral reality, 
as opposition to Labour overrode older party loyalties, and limited the demand for more than 
one anti-socialist candidate in each constituency. Winston Churchill, upon his return to office 
in 1951, even offered the Liberal leader Clement Davies the role of Minister of Education in 
his new cabinet.43  
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 Claims that there was a return to partisan politics after 1945, or that elections in the 
1950s were monochrome, two-party affairs, should thus be treated with caution.44 Such a 
conclusion does a disservice to the patchwork, provisional nature of Unionism; it also 
overlooks the motivations of activists and voters. The ‘culture of coalitionism’ identified by 
Michael Dyer as prevailing on the centre and right of Scottish politics during the 1930s, but 
which he suggests was fading by the late 1940s, was in truth revitalised by antagonism 
towards the post-war Labour government and by the context of the cold war, which 
encouraged anti-communist sentiment, and granted warnings of a drift towards totalitarianism 
a certain plausibility, however ridiculous they appear in retrospect. To select one voice as an 
example: in late 1949, George Ramsay, a member of the executive committee of the Central 
Ayrshire Unionist association, wrote to Lord Woolton, the Conservative party chairman, to 
encourage the pursuit of unity with the Liberals. Despite his participation in Unionist politics, 
Ramsay described himself openly as a lifelong Liberal; crucially, though, while known 
locally as a Liberal, he was, he claimed, ‘better known … as an anti-socialist’, active in 
Unionist politics as it was the only party in the area that was ‘fighting Socialism’.45 
 In constituencies with more robust Liberal traditions than Central Ayrshire, informal 
local agreements, designed to maximise the anti-Labour vote, were reached. The clearest 
example was Dundee, where cooperation between Liberals and Unionists had existed since 
the 1920s, a result of the city being one of the few double-member constituencies to survive 
into the twentieth century. When this changed ahead of the 1950 general election, and 
Dundee was split into eastern and western divisions, the old agreement, whereby the parties 
each nominated one candidate, was rendered obsolete; matters were complicated further by 
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the Unionist pact with the National Liberals. Throughout 1948 and 1949 the Dundee Unionist 
association, now incorporating the National Liberals, encouraged local Liberals to agree to an 
alliance.46 In practice, this meant supporting a National Liberal candidate in both seats. 
Initially, the Liberals refused, insisting that they would contest Dundee West, nominating the 
journalist John Junor and blaming the Unionists for creating a ‘situation where two anti-
Socialist candidates are going forward in the Western division’. Yet there was little local 
appetite for separate candidacies, and an Anti-Socialist association was formed just three 
weeks before polling to press for a pact. Similar demands were made by the Dundee 
Housewives’ association, an organisation that campaigned for an end to rationing.47 Within 
days Junor agreed to stand down, on the condition that if the Unionist candidate was defeated 
then the Liberals would be given the opportunity to contest the seat at the next election. 
Important here is the fact that none of this was sanctioned by the Liberal leadership: indeed, 
the national party promoted a last-minute Liberal candidacy in Dundee West. But this was 
shunned by local members, who viewed anti-socialist unity as the primary aim. Such 
compromises could work in the opposite direction, as in Greenock, where in 1950 the 
Unionists stood aside in favour of the Liberals. Likewise, in Ross and Cromarty the Unionist 
association offered support to Jack Macleod, first elected in 1945 as an independent Liberal, 
stating that as long as candidates opposed socialism, they had little interest in party labels.48 
At the 1951 election Unionists had reached ‘anti-socialist’ understandings, whether with 
Liberals or National Liberals, in twenty of Scotland’s seventy-one constituencies.49 
 These tactics were not always successful: in Dundee and Greenock, the anti-socialist 
candidates, whether Unionist, Liberal, or some combination of both, failed to defeat the 
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Labour incumbents. All the same, they illustrate the extent to which Unionist electoral 
success in the 1950s was conditional. It rested upon two claims: first, that Labour presented a 
threat to individual liberty and economic freedom; second, that the Unionists were best 
placed to check, and then reverse, the socialist advance. The question was always how long 
such a defensive electoral coalition could last, and whether it could survive the transition 
from opposition to government. 
 
II 
The Conservatives, having defeated Labour at the 1951 general election, were returned to 
office with an increased majority in 1955; in Scotland, the Unionists and National Liberals 
together secured a majority of both votes and seats. Soon, though, the anti-socialism that 
underlay Conservative success began to fray, and the party’s vote slumped at a series of by-
elections, climaxing with the Liberal victory at Torrington in March 1958. The humiliation of 
the Suez crisis, which ended the career of Churchill’s successor Anthony Eden, was partly 
responsible; there were, however, other determinants. The stringency of the individualist 
appeal employed by the Conservatives in opposition was always likely to prove difficult to 
sustain in office. Nevertheless, the return of iron and steel to private ownership, and the 
abandonment of Labour’s plans to nationalise road haulage, could, when set alongside 
reductions in income tax and the abolition of rationing in 1954, be presented as evidence that 
the government had delivered on its pledges ‘to restore freedom, to reduce the burden of 
taxation and to give individual men and women a better chance to live a decent life’.50 In 
Scotland, Unionists could point too to the appointment of an additional Minister of State to 
the Scottish Office, and the convening of a Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs, as 
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evidence of their commitment to the defence of Scottish autonomy from the incursions of 
London.51 For the leadership, this represented the limits of the possible: further attempts at 
reform of the nationalised industries, or scaling back of the welfare state, risked controversy. 
But for party activists and voters, this caution was a source of frustration, as rising inflation 
eroded the position of those on fixed incomes and fostered antipathy towards the seemingly 
privileged position enjoyed by organised labour, especially in the public sector.52  
In Scotland, complaints that the government was failing to live up to its pre-election 
rhetoric were heard soon after the Conservatives had regained power: in 1953 there were 
demands from Unionist supporters for ‘more evidence of the intention to reduce the 
government’s expenditure of the taxpayer’s money’. After the 1955 general election these 
grievances were voiced with increasing frequency. In October 1955, Patrick Blair, secretary 
of the Scottish Unionist association, reported a widespread ‘feeling’ amongst the party’s 
supporters that there had not been a sufficient commitment to reducing public expenditure; 
there was, he reported, a feeling that the government was ‘too much afraid of voters who will 
not support it anyhow at any time’, and was doing ‘too little’ to assist ‘the really stabilising 
element of the population’. Unionist voters, he warned, were beginning ‘to say that it does 
not matter which party is in office – they are equally bad’. Here was an early iteration of the 
criticism of consensus that would come to prevail on the political right in the 1970s. The 
following year, Blair related a desire among Unionist voters for reductions in both the level 
of taxation and government spending, amid ‘complaints’ of what was referred to as the ‘slow 
torture of the middle classes’, some of whom were threatening to either abstain at the next 
election, or, worse, vote Liberal.53 As the annual report of the party’s western divisional 
council noted, the challenges facing the ‘Middle Classes’ were being ‘frequently and 
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vigorously stressed’.54 By July 1956, the party’s president, William Sinclair, was protesting 
that he ‘found himself continually defending the Government not against recognised 
opponents but against declared Unionist Electors, some of whom were threatening to 
withdraw their support from the Party’. This anger, Sinclair made clear, was driven by 
concerns over ‘the cost of living, inflation and the lack of resistance to Trade Union demands 
for more and more wages not covered by corresponding increases in production’.55 
The most notable short-term political consequence of these expressions of discontent 
was the emergence of the Middle Class Alliance (MCA) and the People’s League for the 
Defence of Freedom (PLDF), pressure groups that demanded reductions in government 
expenditure, further tax cuts, and, in the case of the PLDF, the removal of the legal privileges 
granted to the trades unions. This so-called ‘middle class revolt’ has been discussed from the 
standpoint of national politics, as part of the background to the electoral revival of the Liberal 
party.56 The activities of the MCA and PLDF, and the January 1958 treasury resignations, 
when the chancellor, Peter Thorneycroft, and two junior treasury ministers, Enoch Powell 
and Nigel Birch, stepped down in protest at the refusal of the cabinet to endorse spending 
cuts intended to curb inflation, have been treated too as a precursor to the politicisation of 
inflation in the 1970s.57 Yet the MCA and PLDF enjoyed a presence in Scotland that should 
encourage a reassessment of the basis of Scottish politics during the 1950s; the Unionist 
leadership certainly feared that the energies of party members were being diverted by 
membership of these organisations.58 Patrick Blair cautioned Unionists against being swayed 
by the aggressive stance adopted by the PLDF in particular: the demand that trades unions 
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should again be made liable for losses incurred as a result of industrial action would, he 
warned, create a ‘tremendous surge of ill-feeling’ likely to be electorally damaging. Blair 
pleaded that the government was trying its utmost ‘to arrest inflation and maintain the value 
of money’.59 
Despite Blair’s efforts, it was difficult to reconcile the pragmatism of the party 
leadership with the distrust of state intervention and organised labour prevalent among 
Unionist supporters; moreover, the affinity between Liberals and Unionists, rooted in a 
hostility towards socialism and concern for individual freedom, was weakening by the second 
half of the 1950s. The Unionist vote collapsed by upwards of twenty percentage points at a 
series of by-elections between 1957 and 1959, each time as a result of Liberal intervention in 
seats not contested by the party since 1950. At Edinburgh South in May 1957, the Liberal 
candidate polled nearly a quarter of the vote: the Unionist post-mortem attributed the increase 
in Liberal support to ‘disgruntlement’ among ‘middle-class voters’ and a ‘feeling that [the] 
government was not sufficiently Tory’, a reference, it seemed, to the failure of the 
government to pursue further economic reforms.60 Similar conclusions were reached by Lord 
John Hope, a junior minister at the Scottish Office and the MP for Edinburgh Pentlands. 
Hope accepted that the ‘cost of living’ was an issue; he suggested, nonetheless, that 
‘something else’ had caused ‘discontent’ to ‘develop into anger’. There was, he felt, ‘a 
widespread feeling that the only people who had been insulated against rises in the cost of 
living were the people who had caused it – the Trades Unionists with their endless wage 
demands’.61 Such sentiments were certainly visible: in early 1958, in a letter to the 
Conservative chairman Lord Hailsham, Gordon Murray, secretary of Dundee Unionist and 
National Liberal association, recorded local support for the recently departed treasury 
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ministers, expressing his hope that the ‘prosperity of the country [would] not be jeopardised 
in pandering to unjust and unrealistic demands, from whatever section they may come’.62  
The stance adopted by the Liberal party during this period is instructive. Jo Grimond, 
the MP for Orkney and Shetland who assumed the leadership of the party in 1956, 
repositioned the Liberals as a progressive alternative to Labour’s state socialism.63 Yet 
Grimond’s defence of individual freedom, criticisms of nationalisation and the welfare state, 
and support for further reductions in personal taxation, represented a renewal of post-war 
anti-socialism and individualism rather than a departure. Notably, the Conservative 
government was now being reproached for being too timid in its reforms, too willing to 
acquiesce in the settlement inherited from Labour. Grimond accused the Conservatives of 
‘conserving Socialism’, and of failing to address the high taxes and excessive government 
expenditure he believed to be the ‘most damaging legacy of Socialism’. To those worried that 
a vote for the Liberals would allow Labour to regain power, Grimond replied that ‘surely 
there is no point in keeping a Conservative Government in power unless it is going to be 
something different in kind from a Socialist Government’.64 
This message was clearly intended to appeal to disillusioned Unionist supporters. In 
May 1958 there were reports from Unionist agents across Scotland of a Liberal revival driven 
by a suspicion that the government was ‘pandering too much to Socialism’ with the result 
that ‘too much is being spent on the Welfare State’.65 At the June 1958 Argyllshire by-
election, the Liberal candidate William McKean, who secured almost thirty per cent of the 
vote, told the public that, although new to the Liberal party, ‘he felt he must take a stand now 
against the two major parties. If we did not the individual would be crushed’. He offered a 
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programme of tax cuts and restrictions on public and private monopolies. Speaking in his 
support, John Bannerman, chairman of the Scottish Liberals, echoed McKean’s 
individualism, declaring that his party would return the state to its proper role as ‘servant of 
the people’, and would always ‘look to the individual’s interest’.66 
By the close of the 1950s the division that had sustained electoral politics in Scotland 
since 1945 had become confused. The Conservative record in office had, unsurprisingly, 
failed to match the heights of the party’s rhetoric in opposition. Equally, the Liberal revival 
after 1955, however limited and lacking in lasting parliamentary success, suggested that the 
longer the Conservative party remained in office, the more exposed it would be to criticisms 
that drew on the very language of liberal individualism that had been so central to its earlier 
victories. It was, however, the party’s response to the 1959 general election that would prove 
critical in the ensuing realignment of Scottish politics. 
 
III 
The loss by the Unionists of their pre-eminent position in Scotland in 1959, a result that 
contrasted with continued Conservative success in England, was believed by contemporaries 
to be a consequence of Scotland’s relatively weak economic performance. Unionists in the 
west of Scotland were convinced that the national decision to campaign on the theme of 
rising prosperity had been mistaken, with the ‘fear of unemployment’ and hostility towards 
the 1957 Rent Act, which lifted controls on private lettings, strengthening support for Labour 
in working-class communities.67 This supposition has been echoed by subsequent 
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assessments, which have stressed the electoral impact of economic concerns, and the extent 
to which this assisted the Labour party by increasing public support for state intervention.68 
 To be sure, the Unionists lost four seats in 1959, all to Labour: Central Ayrshire, 
Lanark, and the Craigton and Scotstoun divisions of Glasgow. There is, all the same, a sense 
that the party misread these results: as Richard Finlay has rightly observed, Labour’s gains in 
Scotland stemmed from the vagaries of the electoral system.69 The Unionists had held the 
four seats lost by a cumulative majority of fewer than 2000 votes: these were constituencies 
secured narrowly in the early 1950s, and the party’s support had only to fall slightly for them 
to be lost. In truth, the Unionist vote was reasonably resilient in 1959: in tandem with the 
National Liberals, the party still outpolled the Labour party across Scotland. Indeed, in 
Glasgow, Unionist support amongst the electorate as a whole even increased marginally, 
despite the loss of two seats, and the party regained the city’s Kelvingrove division, lost at a 
by-election in 1958.70 Claims that Scottish politics had moved leftwards were thus overstated, 
and obscured the extent to which Labour’s vote had largely remained static. Where Unionist 
support did fall this was more often due to the intervention of Liberal candidates. 
Yet the signs that the ties that bound the post-war anti-socialist coalition were 
beginning to loosen went unheeded. Unionist commentators chose to focus instead on the 
contest with Labour, and to continue to treat support for the Liberals uncomplicatedly as a 
proxy vote for Unionism. For the Glasgow Herald, Unionist in loyalty, the Liberals were a 
party ‘dedicated to individual liberty’; their improved performance in 1959 could therefore be 
treated as signalling ‘a firm “No” to policies of restriction and control’, and an indication that 
‘for the majority, the mixed economy now in being, and its efficient management by 
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Conservatism, marks the acceptable limit of government interference with the individual’.71 
Perhaps, but we should note that the Liberals fought the election on a manifesto that called 
for an end to the closed shop, reductions in inheritance tax, and for council tenants to be 
granted the right to buy their homes.72 Grimond, for his part, declared that nationalisation was 
a ‘fiasco’ that would in time prove ‘incompatible with freedom’; he was equally critical of 
‘the promise of endless welfare benefits’ administered by ‘the grandmother state’.73 There 
were, then, those for whom the Conservative conception of the relationship between the state 
and the individual required refinement; after almost a decade in office, for a significant 
section of the electorate it was no longer enough for the Unionists to claim merely to be 
better than Labour. 
The Unionists failed to acknowledge the threat posed by this new appeal to 
individualism, discarding their earlier rhetoric of liberty, and emphasising instead their 
willingness to intervene in the economy, a response that reflected the direction taken by the 
Conservative party under the leadership of Harold Macmillan.74 The government accepted the 
recommendations of the 1961 Toothill enquiry into the Scottish economy, directing 
investment towards ‘growth points’; in 1962, an economic development department was 
added to a steadily expanding Scottish Office.75 A year later, a development plan for central 
Scotland was published, which promised a ‘massive programme of national reconstruction 
and modernisation’, and conceded that ‘full employment’ could ‘only be maintained by 
conscious and far-ranging acts of policy’.76 By the 1964 general election, Sir Alec Douglas-
Home, who had replaced Macmillan as premier a year earlier, could tell electors that he 
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recognised ‘that in modern conditions there must be a good deal of both central and regional 
planning’.77 That year’s Unionist manifesto praised the benefits of planning, pledging the 
creation of a ‘vast new economic complex’ in central Scotland.78 As Priscilla Buchan, 
Unionist member for Aberdeen South since 1946, acknowledged during the campaign, her 
party now accepted ‘far more the need for gov[ernment] to take greater responsibility to 
promote social and economic change’.79 Yet these attempts to rebrand Unionism as a 
modernising creed, one able to deliver a more efficient form of planning than Labour, failed. 
The party lost a further six seats, reducing the number of Unionists MPs to twenty-four, down 
from the thirty-six returned in 1955; the party’s share of the vote fell by almost a fifth. 
The abandonment by the Unionists of the individualist rhetoric of the late 1940s and 
early 1950s created a space within Scottish politics for the Liberal party. The three Highland 
constituencies lost by the Unionists in 1964 fell to the Liberals; the presence of Liberal 
candidates also triggered sharp falls in the Unionist vote in the north-east of Scotland as well 
as in Renfrewshire and Ayrshire, and led to the loss of West Renfrewshire and Glasgow 
Pollok to Labour.80 As the 1960s progressed, however, it would become clear that in parts of 
provincial Scotland the chief beneficiary of the growing inability of the Unionists to pose 
credibly as a party committed to the defence of the individual was the SNP. Scottish 
nationalism’s espousal of an intensely individualist stance during the post-war decades 
remains underappreciated. Yet the nationalist vision was informed by the same fear of an 
overmighty central state as Unionism’s anti-socialism and was often expressed in similar 
language. The post-war SNP was equally enamoured of the virtues of local government; in 
1946 the party newspaper, the Scots Independent, could be found employing lengthy 
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quotations from Hayek’s Road to Serfdom in its editorial column.81 These inclinations were 
heightened by an identification with the small nations of eastern Europe occupied by the 
Soviet Union after 1945, which encouraged anti-communist sentiment within nationalist 
circles. Self-government was, as a result, often envisaged in instrumental terms, as a bulwark 
against a Labour government believed to harbour authoritarian tendencies. As the SNP’s 
1947 policy statement suggested, the conflict between capitalism and socialism had been 
rendered meaningless by the victory of the state, in whatever guise it assumed; the task now 
was to defend individual liberty and the rule of law, and to resist the rise of a ‘despotism 
ruling over an irresponsible proletariat’: Scots must choose ‘either the road to tyranny or the 
way to freedom’.82 
This individualist version of nationalist politics survived the 1950s largely intact, 
finding an outlet in criticisms of the welfare state, which, from a nationalist perspective, 
represented little more than a bribe designed to induce loyalty to the British state.83 The 
SNP’s 1957 conference programme duly dismissed the post-war settlement as ‘a mass of 
taxes designed to make the individual look to the state for his needs’; what masqueraded as 
compassion was just ‘a vote-catching fraud’. The SNP promoted ‘independence for the 
individual Scottish citizen as well as for the Scottish nation’.84 Following the 1959 general 
election, James Halliday, the party chairman who had unsuccessfully contested the Stirling 
and Falkirk Burghs constituency, lamented that Scottish voters appeared content to accept 
‘concessions and handouts’ from central government in ‘a spirit of meek and docile 
gratitude’.85 By the early 1960s, as the SNP’s electoral fortunes began to improve following 
positive performances at the Glasgow Bridgeton and West Lothian by-elections, what Gordon 
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Wilson, SNP national secretary during the 1960s and later MP for Dundee East, described as 
the party’s tradition of ‘libertarianism and desire for decentralisation’ appeared newly 
relevant to a political contest in which both major parties advocated economic planning of 
one form or another.86 In those areas where the Liberals lacked a presence, particularly in 
central and eastern Scotland, the SNP offered an increasingly potent, and overtly 
constitutional, critique of the central state that tapped a historic provincial liberal tradition. 
 
IV 
Support for nationalisation and the welfare state was, no doubt, widespread amongst Scots in 
the post-war era; the consistent ability of the Labour party to attract the support of near half 
the Scottish electorate is testament enough to that. Still, to concentrate on such positive 
responses neglects the existence of another constituency of roughly equal size, one far more 
sceptical of economic planning and resentful of the taxes required to pay for the welfare state. 
For those of the latter inclination, Scotland’s sluggish economic performance in the late 
1950s and early 1960s was evidence that government intervention had failed, not that there 
was any need for more of it. This liberal, individualist strand did not disappear from Scottish 
politics during the upheaval of the 1960s; rather, the ability of Unionism to pose as its 
dominant political expression declined, and the Liberals and the SNP were able to construct 
new versions of this appeal.  
This would become apparent in the wake of Winnie Ewing’s famous victory for the 
SNP at the November 1967 Hamilton by-election. An opinion survey commissioned by the 
Conservatives to discover why they had failed to benefit from discontent with the Labour 
government revealed deep-rooted opposition to what was perceived as excessive government 
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intervention in the economy, an opinion especially visceral in relation to the level of personal 
taxation.87 The policy group launched to consider proposals for devolution in the wake of 
Edward Heath’s May 1968 ‘declaration of Perth’, which, in reaction to Hamilton, had 
committed the Conservatives to supporting a Scottish assembly, uncovered a similar liberal 
ethos and resentment of bureaucracy.88 The group’s report stressed that the popular 
disenchantment central to the nationalist victory at Hamilton was not unique to Scotland, but 
was driven by anger towards central government, by ‘a feeling that decisions are taken by 
people far away from the objects of these decisions’ and ‘a sense of impotence in the face of 
governmental acts and policies’.89 It was, however, no longer axiomatic that the natural 
political home for such sentiments was the Conservative party. 
The weakening of a once-dominant Unionist tradition, the recovery of Scottish 
Liberalism and the rise of the SNP had, to be sure, multiple causes. But the relinquishment by 
the Unionists of an appeal to liberal individualism was a crucial element within this process, 
undercutting as it did the coherence of the party’s identity, and reducing the distinction with 
Labour to one of degree, not kind. There was some awareness of the dangers posed by this 
shift within Unionist ranks: prior to the 1964 election, Lord Dalkeith, the MP for Edinburgh 
North, warned that party literature was placing ‘insufficient emphasis’ on what he felt was 
the ‘essential difference’ between the two major parties: that the Unionists, unlike Labour, 
did not regard ‘the individual as a cog in the great state machine planned and controlled by 
the all-knowing man in Whitehall’.90 Similarly, the inroads made by the Liberals into 
Unionist support in Angus, Aberdeenshire and the Borders was credited to a wish for 
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‘idealism’, especially among younger voters.91 The Unionism of the 1940s and early 1950s 
had, alongside its traditional role as the representative of important interests within Scottish 
society, fulfilled this desire for ideological principle, presenting a powerful critique of 
socialism, and defence of individual liberty and the free economy. But by the 1960s, softened 
by the experience of office, the party had mislaid this intellectual confidence; there were, 
moreover, now other parties able to provide the electorate with liberal political ideals. 
Significantly, however, individual liberty was coming to be viewed through a constitutional 
rather than economic lens. 
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